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Abstract 
This paper provides a guide to statistically based methods for estimating the extra costs of 
educating disadvantaged students, shows how these methods are related, and compares state aid 
programs that account for these costs in different ways. We show how pupil weights, which are 
included in many state aid programs, can be estimated from an education cost equation, which 
many scholars use to obtain an education cost index. We also devise a method to estimate pupil 
weights directly. Using data from New York State, we show that the distribution of state aid is 
similar with either statistically based pupil weights or an educational cost index. Finally, we 
show that large, urban school districts with a high concentration of disadvantaged students would 
receive far more aid (and rich suburban districts would receive far less aid) if statistically based 
pupil weights were used instead of the ad hoc weights in existing state aid programs.  
 
Introduction 
 Both scholars and policy makers have recognized that it costs more to achieve any given 
level of student performance when the students are disadvantaged than when they are not. 
Nevertheless, scholars and policy makers tend to use different methods to account for these extra 
costs. This paper provides a guide to statistically based methods for estimating the extra costs of 
educating disadvantaged students, shows how these methods are related, and compares state aid 
programs that account for these costs in different ways.  
Most scholars have addressed educational costs through the use of an education cost 
index, which operates much like a cost-of-living index. Specifically, an education cost index 
indicates the amount a district must spend relative to the average district to obtain the same 
performance target. Several scholars also have proposed that these cost indexes be used in state 
education aid formulas, and in particular, that higher-cost districts should receive more aid, all 
else equal. 
Educational costs are also considered by many state aid programs. In fact, a state aid 
formula that incorporated a regression-based cost index was implemented for towns (including 
overlapping school districts) in Massachusetts in the 1980s (Bradbury et al. 1984). Cost indexes 
are rarely used, however. Instead, state aid formulas give extra weight to students in high-cost 
categories, such as poor students or students with limited English proficiency (LEP). Because 
state aid is based on the number of weighted students in a district, this approach, like a cost index, 
results in higher aid for districts with more disadvantaged students. If the extra weight for a poor 
student is 20 percent, for example, then a district in which half the students are poor will receive 
10 percent more aid than a district with no poor students, all else equal. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides background on the scholarly 
literature and the use of pupil weights in existing state aid formulas. Section 2 provides a guide 
to calculating pupil weights. This section shows how cost indexes and pupil weights are related, 
devises a new method for estimating pupil weights, and shows how pupil weights can be 
incorporated into an aid formula. Section 3 uses data from New York State to illustrate the 
consequences of various approaches to estimating pupil weights. In particular, this section shows 
which types of districts gain, and which types lose, when measures of expenditure need or 
associated state aid payments are based on pupil weights instead of on a cost index. The final 
section presents conclusions and policy implications. 
 
1. Background 
The idea that educational costs depend on student characteristics can be traced back to the 
famous article by Bradford, Malt, and Oates (1969), which showed that the cost of providing 
public services depends on the environment in which the services are delivered. Scholars who 
have applied this notion to education include Bradbury et al. (1984), Ratcliffe, Riddle, and 
Yinger (1990), Downes and Pogue (1994), Ladd and Yinger (1994), Courant, Gramlich, and 
Loeb (1995), Duncombe, Ruggiero, and Yinger (1996), Duncombe and Yinger (1997, 1998, 
2000), Reschovsky and Imazeki (1998, 2001, 2003), Duncombe and Johnston (2004), and 
Imazeki and Reschovsky (2004). 
Existing scholarly work on pupil weights includes Reschovsky and Imazeki (1998), 
Duncombe (2002), and Duncombe, Lukeymeyer, and Yinger (2003). Reschovsky and Imazeki 
(1998) start by estimating an education cost function. Then they use the estimated parameters to 
predict total spending in each district. One of the variables in their cost regression is the share of 
poor students (as measured by the share of students eligible for a free or reduced-price lunch). 
Next they set this variable at a low value (the value below which it has no impact on costs) and 
predict total spending again. Finally, they obtain a weight for each district by finding the 
difference between these two predictions, which is the impact of actual poverty in the district on 
total spending, and dividing this difference by the number of poor students in the district. They 
find that in both the mean and median district the extra weight for a poor student is 1.59. 
Duncombe, Lukemeyer, and Yinger (2003) use a similar approach to calculate the cost of 
bringing a student with a given disadvantage up to the average performance in the state. This 
approach also results in a different weight in each school district. They estimate that the extra 
weight for a poor student is 1.10 in the upstate big three cities (Buffalo, Syracuse, and Rochester) 
and 0.98 in both New York City and the average suburban district. The LEP weight is 1.12 in the 
Big Three, 1.15 in New York City, and about 1.10 in the average suburb.  
As shown in Tables 1 and 2, many state aid programs account for the higher costs of 
educating disadvantaged students.1 Table 1 indicates that the weighted-pupil approach is used to 
adjust the main operating aid formula for poverty in 15 states, for students with limited English 
proficiency in 9 states, and for students with handicaps in 14 states. The legislated extra weights 
for students with these disadvantages vary widely across states. Among the states that adjust for 
poverty, 11 use weights of 0.3 or below, whereas Maryland uses a weight of 1.0 and New 
Hampshire’s weight reaches 1.0 under some circumstances. The LEP weights vary from 0.06 to 
1.2. Virtually all of these weights fall well below the values estimated by scholars. The weights 
for handicaps vary widely, depending on the handicap to which they apply, and no attempt is 
made to summarize them. Overall, this table testifies both to the intuitive appeal of the weighted-
pupil approach to aid and to the need for a systematic approach to determining the weights. 
A legislated pupil weight may not be used in all state aid programs, and it may be subject 
to various restrictions. Thus, the effective weight may differ from the legislated weight. Table 2 
provides information on effective or implicit poverty weights calculated in several different ways. 
This table reveals wide variation in effective poverty weights across states. Alaska, Connecticut, 
and New Jersey, for example, provide more than twice as much aid for high-poverty districts as 
for low-poverty districts, whereas New Hampshire provides less aid to high-poverty districts 
despite a relatively high extra weight (42.6 percent) for poor pupils. Moreover, no state has an 
effective poverty weight as high as the estimated weight in the scholarly literature.2 
The principle of aid adjustments for student disadvantage has been endorsed by several 
state supreme courts. In a 1990 decision that called for a more equitable educational finance 
system, for example, the New Jersey State Supreme Court declared: 
 
 We have decided this case on the premise that the children of poorer urban districts are as 
capable as all others; that their deficiencies stem from their socioeconomic status; and that 
through an effective education and changes in that socioeconomic status, they can perform 
as well as others. (Abbott v. Burke, 1990, p. 385)  
 
This type of argument has appeared in decisions by the highest courts in several other states, 
including Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. New York, 2003 (See Lukemeyer 2004). 
 
2. How to Calculate Pupil Weights 
Pupil weights are designed to indicate the extra expense associated with students in 
particular categories, holding student performance constant. In principle, these weights should be 
related to actual experience, that is, to the extra expenses that districts must actually pay to bring 
disadvantaged students up to a given standard. The existing literature brings in actual experience 
by deriving pupil weights from the estimated parameters of a standard education cost function.3 
This section begins by exploring various ways to use standard education cost functions to 
determine the added cost per disadvantaged student in a state, expressed as a share of the cost for 
a student with no disadvantages. An alternative approach is to specify an education cost function 
so that the pupil weights can be estimated directly. The second part of this section explores this 
approach. The third part shows how to incorporate pupil weights into a state aid formula. 
Pupil Weights Based on a Standard Education Cost Function  
Consider the following cost function, which is similar to the formulation in most of the  
papers cited earlier: 
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where Sj equals spending per pupil in district j; T equals a vector of student test scores and 
perhaps other performance measures; Z equals other control variables, such as those designed to 
control for district efficiency; P equals the price of the key input, namely teachers; Ci equals the 
share of students in cost category i; and α and β indicate coefficients to be estimated. By taking 
logarithms and adding an error term, this equation can be estimated with standard linear 
regression techniques. Because they are directly influenced by district actions, T and P should be 
treated as endogenous (see Duncombe and Yinger, 1997, 1998, 2000; Reschovsky and Imazeki, 
1998.) 
Once Equation (1) has been estimated, a standard cost index is found in two steps. The 
first step is to calculate the spending required in each district to reach a given performance target, 
called expenditure need, assuming that districts differ only in their cost characteristics. This step 
is accomplished by setting the variables in T at the same performance level for all districts (T ); 
setting the variables in Z at the state average for all districts ( Z ); setting P at the required wage 
level for each district ( P̂ ), based on exogenous factors such as the regional wage level; and 
setting student characteristics in C at their actual value in each district.4 Then, with the estimated 
values of the coefficients, a and b, substituted for the parameters in Equation (1), α and β, one 
obtains this expenditure need in each district, ˆ jS . In symbols, 
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The second step is to divide ˆ jS  by its value in a district with average required wages and 
average student characteristics, say *ˆ jS , which is defined as
5  
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Equations (2) and (3) lead to a cost index for each district, Ij. This index equals 1.0 in a 
district with average characteristics, is above 1.0 in relatively high-cost districts, and is below 1.0 
in relatively low-cost districts. A district with a value of 1.5, for example, has educational costs 
that are 50 percent above those in a district with average characteristics. The formula for a cost 
index is 
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Note that the T and Z terms are the same in every district, so they cancel when the expression for 
Ij is written out.  
One complicating factor is that educational cost indexes sometimes account for 
economies and diseconomies of enrollment scale, as well as for teacher costs and student 
disadvantages. These types of adjustments are somewhat more controversial than others. There is 
extensive evidence, for example, that small districts have higher costs per pupil than middle-
sized districts (see Andrews, Duncombe, and Yinger 2002). This can be interpreted as a cost 
difference, but it can also be interpreted as a sign that the small districts have refused to 
consolidate with their neighbors and thereby to lower their costs.6 Similarly, there is evidence 
that large districts have higher costs than middle-sized districts. This difference may reflect 
diseconomies of district scale, but it might also reflect mismanagement that arises in some large 
districts but not in others. Because these issues are not our primary concern in this paper, we 
calculate pupil weights without considering enrollment. We include enrollment variables in our 
cost regressions, but we treat them as Z variables. As a result, they are simply set at the average 
value for all districts and have no impact on the cost indexes or pupil weights. 
As shown by Reschovsky and Imazeki (1998) and Duncombe (2002), district-specific 
pupil weights can be calculated using reasoning similar to that behind a cost index. The first step 
is to calculate required spending in each district, assuming now that a district has no 
disadvantaged students at all, that is, that every variable in C has a value of zero. In this 
calculation, as in a cost index calculation, T and Z are held constant and P is allowed to vary 
across districts. If district j had no disadvantaged students, in other words, its expenditure need 
would be: 
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The second step is to find the extra spending in the district because of the presence of 
students with disadvantage i. This can be found by comparing required spending once 
disadvantage i is considered with required spending when, as above, one assumes that no 
students have this disadvantage, or 
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The district-specific weight, ijW , is the extra cost per student with disadvantage i in 
district j expressed as a share of spending on students with no disadvantages.7 To find this weight, 
Equation (6) must be divided by the share of students with this disadvantage and by 0ˆ jS , or  
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District-specific weights do not appear in any state aid formula. Instead, states use state-
level weights for each category of student disadvantage. The district-specific weight in Equation 
(7) can be translated into a statewide rate by averaging it across districts. The simulations in the 
next section examine statewide weights that are both simple averages and enrollment-weighted 
averages. 
 A key question for us to address is: How do measures of a district’s expenditure need 
based on a cost index differ from those based on pupil weights? As discussed earlier, expenditure 
need equals the amount a district must spend to meet a given performance target, as defined by a 
set of values for the T variables. Using Equation (2), we know that expenditure need in district j 
equals the amount a district with average costs must spend to reach these performance targets 
multiplied by district j’s cost index, or  
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Because exp{a} ≈ (1+a) when a is small, we can also write 
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 In the case of pupil weights, the base spending concept refers to spending required to 
meet a given performance standard assuming no disadvantaged students but actual wages, 
namely, 0ˆ jS  as defined by Equation (5). Total expenditure need in district j equals 
0ˆ
jS  multiplied 
by the weighted number of students, and student need per pupil (written with a W superscript to 
emphasize the role of weighting, or ˆWjS ) equals 
0ˆ
jS  multiplied by weighted pupils relative to 
actual pupils, or, using Equation (7),  
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Using the same approximation as before, we can also write 
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which is the same as Equation (9). In other words, cost indexes and the associated district-
specific weights yield approximately the same measures of expenditure need for each district. In 
one special case, namely, when there is only one category of disadvantage, there is no need for 
approximation: according to Equations (8) and (10), these two approaches yield exactly the same 
measure of expenditure need. 
The accuracy of the approximation used in this derivation diminishes as the magnitude of 
each ii jb C  increases. Because this approximation is used to derive both Equations (9) and (11), 
however, it is not clear how this feature of the approximation affects the difference between 
these two equations. Switching to state-level weights adds another type of approximation to the 
mix, one that hurts districts with district-specific weights above the state average. In a later 
section we use data from New York to explore the nature of these approximations by identifying 
the types of districts that are put at a disadvantage by the use of various state-level weights 
instead of a cost index. 
Pupil Weights Estimated Directly from an Education Cost Function 
 The pupil weights in the previous section are approximations because the functional form 
of a standard education cost function differs from the algebraic form of a student-weight 
calculation. One way to avoid these approximations, therefore, is to re-specify the education cost 
function so that it estimates the pupil weights directly. 
 Consider a cost function of the following form: 
 ( )0 1 ,T Z P ij j j j i j
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where, the γ’s and the ω’s are parameters to be estimated and, as before, T and P are treated as 
endogenous. This cost function can be estimated with nonlinear two-stage least squares. The ω’s 
are the pupil weights we are after; with this form they can be estimated directly. Let g stand for 
an estimate of a γ parameter and w stand for the estimate of a ω parameter. Then, drawing on our 
earlier notation, with a “D” superscript to indicate direct estimation, expenditure need in district j 
is  
( )0ˆ ˆ 1 .T Z Pg g g gD ij j j j i j
i
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 Recall the approximation noted earlier, namely, that exp{a} ≈ (1+a) when a is small. 
With a = ii j
i
Cω∑ , this approximation translates Equation (12) into Equation (1), or vice versa. 
Despite this algebraic connection between the two equations, however, they are substantially 
different in practice. Compared to Equation (1), the nonlinear Equation (12) requires a more 
complicated estimating procedure but results in a dramatic simplification in the calculation of 
weights and student needs. 
 The obvious question to ask at this point is whether Equation (1) or (12) is a better 
specification of the cost function, that is, which one provides a better explanation for variation in 
school costs.8 This is, of course, an empirical question, which we address in a later section. 
However, a specification test alone cannot determine which approach is best for policy purposes. 
If the two approaches lead to similar results, then one must weigh the benefits of a relatively 
simple estimating equation (Equation (1)) against the benefits of a relatively simple pupil-weight 
calculation (Equation (12)). We return to this issue in our conclusion. 
Pupil Weights in State Aid Formulas 
 The most common type of state aid formula is a foundation formula, which is used to 
some degree in 43 states (Huang 2004). This type of formula is designed to bring all districts up 
to a minimum spending level. Another type of aid formula is a so-called “guaranteed tax base” 
plan, which is the main aid formula in three states and which is combined with a foundation plan 
in ten others. Except in the case of Missouri, which relies exclusively on a GTB formula, the 
weights in Table 1 refer to foundation plans.9 Following the emphasis in existing state aid 
programs, we focus exclusively on the role of pupil weights in a foundation formula.10 
 A foundation formula sets aid per pupil at the difference between an expenditure target, 
S , and the amount of money a district can raise at a standard tax rate, a rate set by state policy 
makers. This amount of money is the tax rate, t , multiplied by the district’s tax base, Vj. To be 
specific,  
 .j jA S tV= −         (14) 
A more general approach is to select an educational performance target and then to base the 
formula on the expenditure needed to reach this target. Suppose S is the expenditure needed to 
reach the desired level of student performance in a district with average costs, namely *ˆ jS , as 
defined by Equation (2). Then, as shown by Ladd and Yinger (1994), a cost index, Ij, can be 
added to yield a performance-based foundation aid program: 
 *ˆ ˆ .j j j j j jA S I tV S tV= − = −       (15) 
With this approach, total aid to a district obviously equals aid per pupil multiplied by number of 
pupils. 
  Pupil weights are designed to replace some, but not all, of the cost index. Specifically, 
pupil weights do not account for differences in teacher costs or in enrollment effects across 
districts. (A few states, namely, Colorado, Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Texas, 
combine pupil weights with an adjustment for teacher costs or the cost of living.)11 To bring in 
pupil weights, therefore, one needs to use a spending base that reflects teacher wages but not 
student characteristics, namely, 0ˆ jS  as defined by Equation (5).
12  Moreover, the number of 
weighted pupils is 
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Pupil weighting applies only to the expenditure target in a foundation aid formula, not to 
the expected local contribution. Introducing pupil weights therefore leads to the following 
formula for aid per (unweighted) pupil:  
 0ˆ .
W
j
j j j
j
N
A S tV
N
= −        (17) 
In this formula, the ratio of weighted to unweighted pupils plays the role of the student-need 
component of an education cost index. The wage component of 0ˆ jS  multiplied by this ratio is 
equivalent to a full cost index. 
 
3. Results for New York State 
 To examine the implications of different approaches to estimating the cost of 
disadvantaged students, we now use data from New York State for the 2000-2001 school year to 
compare the distribution of state aid using Equation (15) with the aid using Equation (17) and 
various forms of pupil weights. As shown in Table 3, we have data for 678 school districts and 
have classified these districts into eight categories ranging from New York City to small rural 
districts upstate.13 These districts differ substantially in terms of enrollment, wages, and the share 
of students with various disadvantages. This table shows, for example, that the share of students 
who applied for a free or reduced-price lunch, a commonly used measure of poverty, ranges from 
74.9 percent in New York City to 11.2 percent in downstate suburbs. In addition, districts vary 
widely in their child poverty rates and in their concentrations of students with limited English 
proficiency or in special education. The special education variable, which provides one way to 
measure the share of students with disabilities, is discussed in more detail below.  
 The last column of Table 3 presents a student performance index, which we will use in 
our cost estimation. This index combines the passing rates on elementary and secondary math 
and reading tests. The elementary tests cover both fourth and eighth grades, and the secondary 
exams, called Regents exams, are given twice as much weight because students must pass them 
to graduate from high school.14 The resulting index can range from 0 (no students pass any test) 
to 200 (all students pass every test). 
Cost Indexes 
 We begin by estimating standard education cost models. These models use the functional 
form given in Equation (1), with operating spending per pupil as the dependent variable. 
Following Duncombe, Lukemeyer, and Yinger (2003), the regressions also control for school-
district efficiency by including variables that have a conceptual link to efficiency, namely, 
property value, income, and state aid—all on a per-pupil basis. 
 We estimate four versions of this model. These models are distinguished by (a) the 
variable used to measure economic disadvantage and (b) whether special education students are 
included. We use two different variables to measure economic disadvantage: the child poverty 
rate in the school district, which is provided by the Census every two years, and the number of 
students in grades K through 6 who sign up for a free lunch or for a reduced-price lunch.15 The 
latter variable fluctuates significantly from year to year, so we use a two-year average in all of 
our estimations. 
Although these two variables are correlated, they are by no means identical.16 As shown 
in Table 3, for example, the subsidized lunch variable tends to have a substantially larger value 
than the child poverty variable. Moreover, the two variables have different strengths and 
weaknesses. The Census poverty variable has the desirable feature that it cannot be manipulated 
by school officials, but it is not available every year, it is often excluded from data bases 
maintained by state education departments, and we have no evidence about its accuracy in years 
not covered by a decennial census. The subsidized lunch variable has the advantages that it is 
available every year, is included in many state data bases, and covers a broader population than 
does the poverty variable. This variable has the disadvantage, however, that it reflects parental 
participation decisions, and perhaps even school management policies. Given these contrasting 
strengths and weaknesses, we do not believe that either variable dominates the other and we 
present results using both of them. 
One final difference between the two variables arises when another measure of student 
disadvantage, the share of students with limited English proficiency (LEP), is added to the cost 
model. As shown below, this LEP variable is highly significant in cost models that include the 
census poverty variable. In contrast, this variable is not close to significant in models that include 
the subsidized lunch variable. Thus, in case of New York, the subsidized lunch variable appears 
to capture the cost effects both of poverty and of LEP, and the LEP variable is dropped from the 
models in which the subsidized lunch variable appears. 
 The second distinction is whether the model includes a third measure of student 
disadvantage, namely, the share of students in a special education program. We focus on a 
measure of students with relatively severe disabilities, because these students have a relatively 
large impact on educational costs and because the identification of these students is largely 
insulated from district discretion. To be specific, this variable indicates the share of students who 
require placement for 60 percent or more of the school day in a special class, or who require 
special services or programs for 60 percent or more of the school day, or who require home or 
hospital instruction for a period of more than 60 days. As we will see, this variable is highly 
significant when it is included in a cost regression. However, this variable does not provide a full 
analysis of the extra costs imposed by student disabilities. It does not include students with 
relatively minor disabilities, for example, and it does not recognize the wide variations in 
spending required for different students in the special education category. Moreover, some states 
prefer to treat special education with categorical grants, instead of incorporating them into basic 
measures of expenditure need and operating aid. As a result, we present all of our results with 
and without special education students in the analysis.  
 These cost models include several cost variables in addition to student characteristics, 
namely, teacher salaries (treated as endogenous) 17  and student enrollment categories. The 
omitted enrollment category is districts with enrollment below 1,000 students. As explained 
earlier, we do not include enrollment effects in our analyses of education costs, expenditure need, 
or state aid. 
 Selected parameter estimates from the cost models are presented in Table 4. (Full results 
for two of these cost models are presented in an appendix.18) The performance index is highly 
significant in all cases, and the teacher wage variable has an elasticity close to unity. The student 
characteristics also have large, statistically significant impacts on costs. A school district’s costs 
increase with the share of students in poverty (whether measured by census poverty or subsidized 
lunches), with limited English proficiency, or with a severe handicap. As noted earlier, the LEP 
variable is not close to significant in models that use the subsidized lunch variable so it has been 
dropped from these models.  
The second panel of Table 4 presents results for Equation (12), which provides direct 
estimates of the pupil weights. This equation also performs well, and the results in this panel are 
similar to those in the first panel. We conducted specification tests to determine whether 
Equation (1) (the first two panels) or Equation (12) (the last panel) provides a better fit for any 
given column.19 We find that neither one of these models can be rejected in favor of the other; 
that is, there is no statistical basis for selecting one of them. This choice must be made on other 
grounds. 
 We then use the cost models in Table 4 to calculate cost indexes, using the approach 
presented earlier. Our cost indexes reflect teacher wage costs (based on exogenous factors only) 
and student characteristics. Not surprisingly, the resulting cost indexes vary widely by district 
category. The first panel of Table 5 presents cost indexes based on the census poverty and LEP 
variables. As shown in Table 5, our first cost index ranges from about 94 in upstate suburbs and 
rural districts to 170.2 in New York City. This index also has relatively high values in Yonkers, 
the Big Three, and downstate small cities, and intermediate values in downstate suburbs and 
upstate small cities. The other cost indexes in the first panel exhibit similar patterns, with slightly 
more variation across types of district when the special education variable is included. 
 The second panel of Table 5 presents cost indexes based on the share of students in 
grades K through 6 who applied for a free or reduced-price lunch. The cost indexes in this panel 
exhibit a larger variance than those in the first panel; the range in the first column, for example, 
is from 84.4 in the upstate rural districts to 195.7 in New York City. Moreover, the index for 
New York City exceeds 200 if special education students are included or if the pupil weights are 
estimated directly. 
Pupil Weights 
 Our next step is to calculate statewide pupil weights and to extract the pupil weights 
estimated using Equation (12). The results are in Table 6. All the weights in this table are above 
1.0, indicating that the cost of educating a student with any one of the three disadvantages we 
observe is more than twice as high as the cost of educating a student with none of these 
disadvantages. These weights are therefore higher than the weights used by any state except 
Maryland (see Tables 1 and 2). Moreover, the weights for special education students are all 
above 1.8.  
In every case, the pupil weight goes up as one moves from column 1 to column 2 or from 
column 2 to column 3. In other words, enrollment-weighted weights are larger than weights for 
the average district, and directly estimated weights are larger than the weights calculated from a 
standard education cost function. In addition, the poverty weights in the first and third models, 
which are based on the census child poverty variable, decline by a small amount when students 
requiring special education are added to the analysis, whereas the LEP weight increases slightly 
when this change is made. Overall, this poverty weight ranges from 1.22 to 1.67, the LEP weight 
ranges from 1.01 to 1.42, and the special education weight varies from 2.05 to 2.64. 
 Table 6 also presents estimated weights using the number of students applying for a 
subsidized school lunch. Without either the special education variable or a direct estimating 
procedure, the extra weight for an economically disadvantaged student is higher with the child 
poverty variable than with the subsidized lunch variable. If the pupil weights are estimated 
directly or if the special education variable is included in the estimation, the weight based on 
subsidized lunch is larger, sometimes considerably larger, than the weight based on census 
poverty.  
Expenditure Need 
 Tables 7 and 8 compare expenditure need calculations using various approaches to the 
cost of disadvantaged students. Table 7 is based on the census child poverty variable; Table 8 
uses the subsidized lunch variable. The baseline in all cases is expenditure need with a full cost 
index, which we regard as the most direct approach with the clearest conceptual foundation. Our 
objective is to determine how much expenditure need diverges from this baseline when pupil 
weights are used. As explained earlier, pupil weights approximate a cost index approach, so our 
objective is equivalent to calculating which categories of districts are placed at a disadvantage by 
this type of approximation. All our calculations include an adjustment for teacher wages.  
 The first row in each panel of Tables 7 and 8 compares aggregate expenditure need using 
the weights identified in each column with aggregate expenditure need using a standard cost 
index. A value below 1 indicates that aggregate expenditure need falls below the baseline value 
and a value above 1 indicates that aggregate expenditure need is higher with those weights than 
with the baseline cost index.  
The first column in Table 7 shows how much expenditure need diverges from the 
baseline when student characteristics are not accounted for at all. In the first panel, without 
special education, this approach lowers aggregate expenditure need substantially, namely, by 
almost 30 percent, compared to the baseline and places large cities at a significant disadvantage. 
To be specific, the expenditure-need numbers for New York City, Yonkers, and the Big Three 
fall about 40 percent below the baseline. In contrast, this approach leads to expenditure needs 
that are only about 10 percent below the baseline in suburbs, both upstate and downstate. 
 The introduction of pupil weights brings the expenditure need calculations much closer 
to the baseline for all types of districts. As shown in the second and third columns of the first 
panel in Table 7, expenditure need falls no more then 8 percent below the baseline for big cities, 
and no more than 1 percent below the baseline for suburbs (on average), when estimated 
statewide pupil weights are used. Because the enrollment-weighted average weights tend to be 
larger than the simple average weights, the use of an enrollment-weighted average boosts 
expenditure need and narrows the divergence from the baseline. Indeed, the results in the third 
column of Table 7 reveal almost no divergence from the baseline outside the large cities. The 
divergence in the large cities is about 6 percent. 
One simple approximation to estimated weights that is similar to the program passed in 
Maryland is to use a weight of 1.0 for both poverty and LEP. The fourth column of the first panel 
in Table 7 indicates that this approach provides a reasonable approximation to estimated weights 
in the suburbs, where expenditure need is about 3 percent below the baseline, but only a rough 
approximation in the big cities, where expenditure need falls about 15 percent below the baseline. 
Finally, as shown in the last column of this panel, a calculation using weights that are directly 
estimated comes very close to matching the results of a cost-index calculation. Indeed, with this 
approach, New York City and the Big Three are only 1 percent below the baseline and no group 
of districts falls above or below the baseline by as much as 3 percent. This result is not surprising; 
as shown earlier, cost indexes and directly estimated pupil weights are approximately the same 
thing. 
The second panel of Table 7 provides comparable results based on a cost model with 
special education students included. The results from this model are similar to those in the first 
panel, although the first two models (with no weights and with simple average weights) and the 
last model (with directly estimated weights) diverge from the baseline somewhat more than the 
comparable models in the first panel. With enrollment-weighted weights, for example, the big 
cities now fall about 10 percent below the baseline.  
Table 8 presents results from an alternative pair of models that use the subsidized lunch 
variable instead of the child poverty and LEP variables in both the baseline cost-index approach 
and in all the calculations with pupil weights. This table reveals that leaving out weights 
altogether results in an even larger divergence from the baseline with the subsidized lunch 
variable than with the census poverty variable. Results in the other columns are similar to the 
comparable ones in Table 7, particularly those based on directly estimated pupil weights. Recall 
that with a single cost variable, as in the first panel of Table 8, a district-specific weight is 
identical to a cost index. Hence, the only source of deviations from the baseline in the second 
and third columns of this panel is the averaging procedure. The results in these two columns 
therefore prove that moving from district-specific weights to statewide weights is unfair to high-
cost districts, particularly large cities, and that an enrollment-weighted average is preferable to a 
simple average. 
One contrast between Tables 7 and 8 can be found in the fourth column of the panel with 
special education. In this case, the use of rounded weights (1.0 for subsidized lunch, 1.0 for LEP, 
and 2.0 for special education) leads to a much larger underestimate of expenditure need, 
particularly in the big cities, in Table 8 than in Table 7. This understatement is implicitly 
predicted by the relevant directly estimated weights in Table 6, which are 2.1 for subsidized 
lunch and 3.0 for special education. 
Foundation Aid 
As explained earlier, expenditure-need calculations feed into foundation aid formulas. 
Thus, baseline state aid is the aid a district would receive with a foundation aid formula that 
incorporates a full cost index. Our simulations define a baseline aid program by setting the 
student performance index at 160, which is the current state average. Tables 9 and 10 show how 
switching to pupil weights alters state aid for each category of district compared to this baseline. 
To make the columns comparable, we hold the total budget constant (that is, equal to the baseline 
amount) in all cases by raising or lowering the foundation level.20 Results for a baseline aid 
program defined by a student performance index of 140 are very similar to those in Tables 9 and 
10. 
As in Tables 7 and 8, the first column of these two tables indicates the impact of ignoring 
student characteristics. In Table 9, which examines aid programs based on the census poverty 
and LEP variables, this step would cut the aid of the big-city districts by 20 percent or more 
(compared to the baseline) and would greatly boost the aid of all other categories of districts. 
Indeed, both the upstate and downstate suburbs would receive at least 46 percent more aid, on 
average, with this approach than with the baseline approach. 
The next four columns show that introducing pupil weights would bring all categories of 
districts much closer to their baseline aid. Indeed, regardless of which pupil weights are used, the 
big cities would all be within 8 percent of their baseline aid. In all cases, both the upstate and the 
downstate suburbs receive more aid with pupil weights than with the baseline cost index. In 
columns two through four, the aid in these districts is between 6 and 20 percent above the 
baseline. Not surprisingly, the divergence from the baseline is smallest with directly estimated 
weights (the last column). Indeed, in this case, aid to large cities and suburbs is always within 4.5 
percent of the baseline amount.  
Note that use of rounded weights is less disadvantageous to large cities in Table 9 than in 
Table 7. This result reflects the fact that Table 9 holds the state aid budget constant and thereby, 
in effect, eliminates the absolute decline in expenditure need in the earlier table. Finally, a 
comparison of the two panels of Table 9 indicates that deviations from baseline aid are 
somewhat larger when special education is included in the analysis. However, the difference 
between a result in the second panel and the comparable result in the first panel is rarely above 2 
percentage points. 
As shown in Table 10, the patterns across districts are similar when the subsidized lunch 
variable is used instead of the census poverty and LEP variables. In most cases, the divergence 
from baseline is somewhat larger in Table 10 than for the comparable result in Table 9, 
particularly when special education is included. With rounded weights and special education, for 
example, the Big Three fall 8 percentage points below the baseline when child poverty is used 
but 16 points below the baseline with subsidized lunch. Most of the other differences are 
considerably smaller than this.  
 
4. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
There is widespread agreement among scholars, policy makers, and state courts that 
school districts with relatively high concentrations of disadvantaged students should receive 
relatively more state aid per pupil, all else equal. In the academic literature, the state-of-the-art 
approach is to estimate an education cost function that includes measures of student disadvantage, 
to calculate an education cost index on the basis of this estimation, and then to introduce this 
education cost index into a foundation aid formula. Although a few state aid formulas contain 
elements of the cost-index approach, most state aid formulas adjust for the presence of 
disadvantaged students using pupil weights. Pupil weights appear to be more appealing to policy 
makers than the more abstract notion of an education cost index. The key problem is that, in 
almost every case, the weights that appear in state aid formulas are determined on an ad hoc 
basis and are far below the weights estimated by scholars. 
We show that a state aid formula using pupil weights can be thought of as an 
approximation for a state aid formula using a cost index. The closeness of this approximation 
cannot be determined a priori, but it can readily be calculated on the basis of an estimated 
education cost function. We show that a state aid formula combining pupil weights and teacher 
wage cost adjustments derived from a standard cost function distributes aid in a way that is 
approximately the same as an aid formula based on a cost index. For the large, urban school 
districts where most disadvantaged students are concentrated, aid based on statistically based 
pupil weights provides a reasonable approximation for aid based on the preferred cost-index 
approach. These two approaches differ somewhat more in their treatment of suburban and rural 
school districts, which receive almost 20 percent more aid with some types of weights than with 
a cost index. Finally, switching to a nonlinear cost function that estimates pupil weights directly 
yields an aid formula that closely approximates the baseline approach in almost every case. 
Indeed, with directly estimated weights, aid to big cities never falls more than 4 percent below 
baseline aid (and aid to suburban districts falls within 5 percent of the baseline), unless special 
education is included in the formula and subsidized lunch is the measure of poverty.  
The pupil weights we estimate are much larger than the weights that appear in any state 
aid formula except for Maryland’s. In a typical aid formula, the extra weight for a pupil from a 
poor family or with limited English proficiency is about 25 percent. We estimate that these extra 
weights should be between 111 and 215 percent. The use of pupil weights obviously results in a 
much poorer approximation of our preferred aid formula when these lower weights are used. At 
the extreme, defined by extra weights of zero, the aid received by large urban districts falls at 
least 20 percent below the baseline level, and the aid received by suburban districts may exceed 
the baseline by over 100 percent. The low weights used in most state aid programs yield results 
not too different from this extreme case. The key problem, therefore, is not the use of pupil 
weights per se; it is the use of pupil weights that are far below the levels supported by the 
evidence.  
We estimate similar weights for the census poverty and subsidized lunch variables. We 
also conclude that in New York the LEP variable need not be included in an aid formula based 
on the subsidized lunch variable, at least not when the weight on the subsidized lunch variable is 
high enough, but we find that rounded weights of 1.0 for both subsidized lunch and LEP provide 
a reasonable approximation to a cost-index approach. We also estimate an extra weight of at least 
185 percent for a student in special education, but this weight obviously is linked to our special 
education variable and may not apply to the special education variables that appear in state aid 
formulas.  
Overall, public officials who design state aid formulas face two key choices regarding 
disadvantaged students.21 The first choice is whether to account for the extra cost of educating 
these students using a cost index or pupil weights. Judging from the choices states have made so 
far, the use of pupil weights appears to be a more appealing approach, and we show that, for 
most districts, it can result in aid amounts that closely approximately the aid amounts from a 
formula based on a cost index, which is the approach many scholars prefer. 
The second choice is how to select pupil weights. The ad hoc process used in most states 
is not up to the task. Indeed, the weights used by most states are far below the weights estimated 
in this paper and by other scholars. These low weights result in aid payments that support far 
lower levels of student performance in school districts with more disadvantaged students than in 
other school districts. This outcome violates the key objective of a foundation aid formula, 
namely, to bring all districts up to the same minimal performance standard. Finally, we find that 
any pupil weights based on an estimated cost function provide a reasonable approximation to the 
use of a full education cost index, but that an even better approximation can be obtained using 
pupil weights estimated directly from a nonlinear cost function. We find no statistical basis for 
preferring a standard cost function to this nonlinear version, so the choice of method depends on 
whether policy makers prefer the complexity of the weight calculation with a standard cost 
function to the complexity of a nonlinear estimating procedure. 
A state aid program is not consistent with student performance objectives unless it 
accounts for the higher cost of reaching a performance target in districts with a relatively large 
share of disadvantaged students. The use of state aid formulas with extra weight for 
disadvantaged students is a reasonable approach to this problem, but the fairness of this approach 
can be greatly enhanced through the use of statistically based pupil weights. 
 Endnotes 
 
1.  The information in this table is based on legislative language in various published sources 
and web sites, so it may not be complete or include all the latest aid revisions. We are 
grateful to Yao Huang for compiling this information. 
 
2.  The figures in Table 2 predate the new aid program in Maryland; this new program may 
be an exception to this claim. 
 
3.  Some scholars (e.g., Guthrie and Rothstein 1999) have criticized the cost-function 
approach and have proposed alternatives, such as the use of professional educators to 
identify the programs necessary to reach a given performance standard in a school with 
many disadvantaged students. (The high pupil weights in Maryland are based on a study 
that uses this so-called “professional judgment” approach. See Maryland Commission on 
Education Finance, Equity and Excellence 2002.) In our judgment, however, a cost 
function makes the best use of available information and is the preferred approach. For a 
detailed discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the various methods, see 
Duncombe, Lukemeyer, and Yinger (2004). 
 
4.  A note on notation: A “^” indicates a spending level “required” to reach a performance 
target under some specified set of conditions (or a wage level required to attract teachers), 
a “~” indicates a policy parameter, and a “-“ indicates a mean value. In a few cases the 
first and last symbols both appear, indicating the mean of a predicted value. 
 
5. An alternative base in this type of calculation is the value of ˆ jS  in the average district. 
This alternative base leads to similar results, but we find it less appealing because it shifts 
the focus away from the average values of the student characteristics on which the 
weights are based.  
 
6. In spite of these problems, about one-third of the states give more aid to small or sparsely 
settled districts. See Huang (2004). 
 
 
 
7. If the data made it possible to identify students with multiple disadvantages (which ours 
do not), then each combination of disadvantages could be treated as a separate cost 
category. 
 
8. The specifications in (1) and (12) are not the only possible ones. In fact, some scholars, 
such as Gyimah-Brempong and Gyapong (1991), have used a more general specification.  
 
9. Texas is one of the ten states with a first-tier foundation formula and a second-tier GTP 
formula. It uses pupil weights in both tiers. See Huang (2004). 
 
10. The widespread use of foundation plans reflects, among other things, a widespread 
emphasis on an adequacy objective in recent state supreme court decisions concerning 
education finance. See Lukemeyer (2002, 2004). 
 
11. This information was provided by Yao Huang. 
 
12. In principle, one could also include enrollment effects in this baseline spending number. 
 
13.  The major sources of data are various publications from the New York State Education 
Department and New York State Office of the Comptroller. Child poverty rates and 
population are from the 2000 Census of Population. 
 
14. For more information on this index, see Duncombe, Lukemeyer and Yinger (2003). This 
index is treated as endogenous. We used geographic proximity to identify instruments. 
Specifically, our list of potential instruments consists of averages, minimum and 
maximum values for adjacent school districts for various measures of fiscal capacity 
(income, school aid, and property wealth), student need (poverty, LEP, subsidized lunch, 
and special education), physical conditions (pupil density, population density, 
enrollment), and student performance (test scores). To select instruments from this list, 
we used three standard rules. The instruments must (1) make conceptual sense, (2) help to 
explain the endogenous explanatory variables, and (3) not have a significant direct impact 
on the dependent variable. We also implemented an over-identification test (Woolridge 
2003) to check the exogeneity of our final set of instruments and the Bound, Jaeger, and 
 
 
Baker (1995) procedure to check for weak instruments. The latter procedure is not 
formally specified for a model like ours, so we examined various combinations of the 
instruments and used the set that produced the highest F-test for most endogenous 
variables. In most cases, the F-statistic was 5.0 or above, indicating reasonably strong 
instruments for that endogenous variable. When estimating equation (12) we use the 
same instruments selected for estimating (1). 
 
15. The free lunch and reduced-price lunch programs are separate, but we combine them in 
all our analyses. Eligibility rules and funding for these lunch programs is provided by the 
federal government. Subsidized lunches are also offered after sixth grade but many 
eligible students do not sign up for them, so a subsidized lunch variable for non-
elementary grades does not appear to be useful. 
 
16. For the year 2000, for example, the correlation between the share of K-6 students who 
sign up for a subsidized lunch and the child poverty rate is 0.773. Correlations in other 
years are similar. 
 
17. The teacher wage variable was first limited to teachers with five years or less of 
experience. Teacher wages for individual teachers were then regressed on teacher 
experience and whether the teacher had a graduate degree. The results of this regression 
were used to construct a predicted teacher salary for each district for a teacher with 
statewide average experience (among those with no more than 5 years of experience) and 
average probability of a graduate degree. The potential instruments for this variable are 
pupil density in the district, private wages in professional occupations, unemployment 
rate, concentration of area teachers in the district, and the average (maximum and 
minimum) salaries of adjacent districts. The final list was selected using the rules 
presented in an earlier footnote. 
 
18. The two regressions in this appendix table, along with comparable regressions for other 
models, which are not presented, indicate that the performance index always has the 
expected positive impact on costs and is statistically significant. The three efficiency 
variables also have the expected signs and are significant in most cases, and all districts 
 
 
in all enrollment classes except the largest have significantly lower costs per pupil than 
districts in the smallest enrollment class. 
 
19. We use the specification tests in Davidson and MacKinnon (2004, Chapter 15).  
 
20. These simulations set the required local property tax rate, t , at 1.5 percent, which is 
lower than the rate in most districts. Alternative tables that hold the foundation level 
constant and allow the state aid budget to change are available from the authors upon 
request, as are tables with a performance standard of 140 instead of 160. 
 
21. Another key choice, which is not examined in this paper, is whether to use a teacher wage 
index. Even with accurate pupil weights, an aid formula would not be fair to high-wage 
locations unless in it included a wage index or a cost of living index. Only about a dozen 
states have this type of index now (Huang 2004). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.  Legislated Pupil Weights in Selected State Aid Programs  
 
 Pupil Weight For 
State Poverty LEP Handicap a 
Alaska   yes 
Arizona  0.06 yes 
Colorado 0.115-0.3   
Connecticut 0.25 b 0.1  
Delaware     yes c 
Florida  0.201 yes 
Georgia   yes 
Idaho  b c   yes c 
Iowa  0.19 yes 
Kansas 0.1 0.2  
Kentucky 0.15 b   
Louisiana 0.17   
Massachusetts 0.343-0.464 b  yes 
Maryland 1.0 1.2  
Minnesota 0.01-0.6 b   
Mississippi 0.05   
Missouri 0.22   
New Hampshire 0.5-1.0   
New Mexico 0.0915  yes 
Oklahoma 0.25  yes 
Oregon 0.25 0.5 yes 
South Carolina   yes 
Texas 0.2 b 0.1 yes 
West Virginia   yes 
Source:  Compiled by Yao Huang based on NCES (2001); updated with information 
from various sources as cited in Huang (2004).       
a. Weights for students with handicaps vary widely depending on the nature of 
       the handicap. 
b. These states also provide categorical grants for students in this category. 
c. These states adjust aid per teacher unit for weighted pupils, which is similar 
to standard pupil weights. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Implicit Poverty Weights in State Aid Programs 
  
  Per Pupil State 
 Implicit Poverty Weights Aid: Ratio of High 
   Ratio of High Poverty 
   Poverty District to Districts to 
State Carey (2002)a Estimatedb Average District Average District 
Alabama 3.1% 2.7% 0.90 1.00 
Alaska      1.97 
Arizona 2.0% 0.0% 0.79 1.10 
Arkansas 2.0% 10.6% 1.23 1.03 
California 5.5% 6.5% 0.69 1.12 
Colorado 25.8%    1.02 
Connecticut 37.1% 3.6% 1.01 2.04 
Delaware      1.22 
Florida      1.10 
Georgia 1.9%    1.06 
Idaho      1.10 
Illinois 22.3% 1.9% 0.34 1.20 
Indiana 20.1% 1.2% 0.83 1.34 
Iowa 2.6% 2.5% 1.13 0.99 
Kansas 15.8%    1.16 
Kentucky 25.5%    1.16 
Louisiana 19.7%    1.03 
Maine      1.04 
Maryland 23.5% 16.9% 1.16 1.69 
Massachusetts 52.5%    1.60 
Michigan 20.3% 13.0% 0.98 1.13 
Minnesota 35.8% 27.2% 1.63 1.35 
Mississippi 4.9% 17.2% 0.80 1.01 
Missouri 36.0%    1.26 
Montana      1.15 
Nebraska 15.0%    1.19 
Nevada   0.1% 0.00 1.52 
New Hampshire 42.6%    0.98 
New Jersey 31.9% 46.3% 1.48 2.17 
New Mexico 13.8% 0.6% 1.25 1.01 
New York 19.6%    1.07 
North Carolina 14.6%    1.09 
North Dakota      1.13 
Ohio 17.2% 9.1% 1.38 1.39 
Oklahoma 32.1%    1.06 
Oregon 17.1%    1.23 
Pennsylvania   1.2% 0.44 1.33 
Rhode Island 25.4%    1.55 
South Carolina 16.3% 11.2% 0.93 1.01 
South Dakota      1.26 
Tennessee 2.7%    1.05 
Texas 27.7%    1.16 
Utah 4.6% 7.5% 1.39 1.00 
Vermont 3.7%    1.56 
 
 
Virginia 15.1% 12.1% 0.99 1.27 
Washington 7.7% 12.6% 0.77 1.12 
West Virginia      1.04 
Wisconsin 10.0%    1.30 
Wyoming 3.0%     1.55 
a Source, Carey (2002). 
b Compensatory aid per child (5 to 17 years old) in poverty divided by total spending per 
pupil. 
 
 
 
Table 3.  Description of New York School Districts, 2001 
         
 
Number of 
Average 
Teacher 
Average 
Teacher Percent Child 
Percent 
Subsidized Percent Special 
Student 
Performance 
 Districts Enrollment Salary Poverty Lunch (K6) LEP1 Education2 Index3 
Large Cities         
New York City 
1 1,069,141 $39,561 34.90% 74.86% 12.32% 7.41% 103 
Yonkers 
1 24,847 $47,237 31.31% 59.72% 16.42% 8.52% 107 
Upstate Big Three 
3 35,575 $33,113 46.46% 74.53% 6.76% 9.46% 96 
 
Small Cities 
        
Downstate 7 
 
5,647 
 
$47,947 
 
16.62% 
 
33.48% 
 
7.73% 
 
6.07% 
 
148 
 
Upstate 49 4,324 $34,848 25.39% 41.73% 2.23% 6.68% 145 
 
Suburbs 
        
Downstate 
168 3,387 $46,082 8.80% 11.22% 3.20% 4.85% 169 
Upstate 
242 2,450 $35,004 13.24% 19.39% 0.32% 4.44% 160 
 
Rural 
        
Upstate 207 1,113 $33,135 21.57% 29.09% 0.22% 4.33% 156 
 
Statewide  678 1,657 $35,413 14.67% 21.81% 0.00% 4.72% 161 
         
Note:  Except in column 1, statewide figures are for the median district. 
1LEP stand for “limited English proficiency.” 
2The share of students who require placement for 60 percent or more of the school day in a special class, or require special services or 
programs for 60 percent or more of the school day, or require home or hospital instruction for a period of more than 60 days. 
3Index reflects passing rates on elementary middle school and high school tests; maximum possible value is 200. 
 
 
 
Table 4.  Estimated Performance and Cost Coefficients 
 
 
Without Special Ed. With Special Ed. 
 
Census 
Poverty 
Subsidized 
Lunch 
Census 
Poverty 
Subsidized 
Lunch 
 
 
Standard Cost Models1 
 
Performance index 0.0073 0.0105 0.0079 0.0140 
 (2.87) (3.12) (3.26) (3.2) 
     
Average teacher salary2 1.0006 1.4030 0.9392 1.3541 
 (8.06) (15.07) (8.82) (13.87) 
     
Percent child poverty (2000)3 1.3071  1.1424  
 (4.06)  (4.17)  
     
2-year avg. LEP3 0.9883  0.9908  
 (2.09)  (2.46)  
     
K6 subsidized lunch rate3  0.9819  1.1258 
  (3.78)  (3.68) 
     
Special education students3,4   1.9547 1.7762 
   (3.34) (2.63) 
 
 Direct Estimate of Pupil Weights5 
 
Performance index 0.0075 0.0117 0.0079 0.0142 
 (2.85) (3.00) (3.32) (3.07) 
     
Average teacher salary2 1.0045 1.5639 0.9520 1.5519 
 (7.93) (9.69) (9.13) (8.11) 
     
Percent child poverty (2000)3 1.6672  1.5915  
 (3.21)  (3.11)  
     
2-year avg. LEP3 1.3078  1.4236  
 (1.81)  (2.07)  
     
K6 subsidized lunch rate3  1.6896  2.1452 
  (2.36)  (1.96) 
     
Special education students3,4   2.6440 3.0157 
   (2.69) (1.75) 
1Estimated with linear two-stage least squares regression, with the student performance and teacher salaries 
treated as endogenous. Operating spending per pupil is the dependent variable; t-statistics are in 
parentheses.  Full results for the first two columns of Panel 1 are in the appendix. 
2For fulltime teachers with 1 to 5 years of experience.  Expressed as a natural logarithm. 
3Variables expressed as percentages.  Coefficients are similar to elasticities. 
4The share of students who require placement for 60 percent or more of the school day in a special class, or 
require special services or programs for 60 percent or more of the school day, or require home or hospital 
instruction for a period of more than 60 days. 
5Estimated with nonlinear two-stage least squares regression.  Other features are the same as in note 1. 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.  Cost Index Results1 
 
 
 Standard Cost Function Direct Weight Estimation 
   
 Without 
 Special Ed. 
With  
Special Ed. 
Without  
Special Ed. 
With 
 Special Ed. 
  
Using Census Poverty and LEP 
Large Cities     
New York City 170.2 172.0 165.4 169.9 
Yonkers 159.2 166.3 155.9 164.3 
Upstate Big Three 135.5 143.6 131.0 141.8 
     
Small Cities     
Downstate 140.3 141.7 141.1 140.0 
Upstate 110.8 113.9 110.6 112.6 
     
Suburbs     
Downstate 114.8 115.1 114.7 113.7 
Upstate 93.8 93.9 93.7 92.7 
     
Rural     
Upstate 93.6 93.0 93.8 91.8 
     
 Using Percent of Students Receiving Subsidized Lunch 
Large Cities     
New York City 195.7 233.9 207.6 222.3 
Yonkers 157.5 199.1 176.1 194.9 
Upstate Big Three 142.8 181.7 148.4 160.0 
     
Small Cities     
Downstate 146.0 165.8 165.1 173.5 
Upstate 108.7 130.3 121.1 128.4 
     
Suburbs     
Downstate 108.8 111.9 111.9 111.8 
Upstate 86.7 93.2 94.0 93.7 
     
Rural     
Upstate 84.4 96.0 94.8 96.0 
1These indexes incorporate cost adjustments for teacher salaries and student needs, but not for 
enrollment.  A district with state-wide average characteristics has an index value of 100. 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.  Estimated Pupil Weights 
    
  
Enrollment- 
Weighted  
 Simple Average Average Directly Estimated 
              
 Using Census Poverty and LEP 
 
Without Special Education   
   
Child Poverty 1.415 1.491 1.667 
    
Limited English 1.007 1.030 1.308 
  Proficiency       
    
With Special Education   
   
Child Poverty 1.224 1.281 1.592 
    
Limited English 1.009 1.033 1.424 
  Proficiency    
    
Special Education 2.049 2.081 2.644 
 
 
Using Share of Students Signed up for Subsidized Lunch 
 
Without Special Education   
   
K6 Free and Reduced 1.108 1.294 1.690 
  Price Lunch Share    
  (2-year average)       
  
With Special Education  
  
K6 Free and Reduced 1.361 1.552 2.145 
  Price Lunch Share    
  (2-year average)    
    
Special Education 1.853 1.880 3.016 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Estimated Expenditure Need with Pupil Weights Relative to Baseline, Using 
                  Census Child Poverty Variable 
      
Regions 
No Student 
Needs 
Adjustment 
Pupil 
Weights 
(Simple 
Avg.) 
Pupil Weights 
(Enrollment - 
Weighted 
Avg.) 
Poverty and 
LEP Weights =1 
Special 
Education 
Weight =21 
Directly 
Estimated 
Pupil 
Weights 
 
 
Without Special Education 
Ratio of Total Cost With This  
   Adjustment  to Spending with  
   Full Cost Index 0.713 0.956 0.967 0.898 1.004 
        
Large Cities       
New York City 0.592 0.923 0.939 0.847 0.991 
Yonkers 0.611 0.931 0.945 0.866 1.000 
Upstate Big Three 0.583 0.921 0.938 0.833 0.986 
Small Cities      
Downstate 0.764 0.980 0.990 0.937 1.027 
Upstate 0.734 0.973 0.985 0.909 1.018 
Suburbs      
Downstate 0.880 0.995 1.000 0.970 1.019 
Upstate 0.899 1.001 1.006 0.972 1.019 
Rural      
Upstate 0.814 0.992 1.002 0.941 1.024 
  
With Special Education 
Ratio of Total Cost With This 
   Adjustment  to Spending with  
   Full Cost Index 0.650 0.930 0.940 0.900 1.019 
        
Large Cities      
New York City 0.539 0.890 0.903 0.851 1.003 
Yonkers 0.539 0.889 0.901 0.856 1.003 
Upstate Big Three 0.514 0.876 0.889 0.832 0.988 
Small Cities      
Downstate 0.687 0.955 0.963 0.931 1.041 
Upstate 0.662 0.945 0.955 0.912 1.031 
Suburbs      
Downstate 0.796 0.980 0.985 0.966 1.038 
Upstate 0.830 0.991 0.996 0.975 1.039 
Rural      
Upstate 0.761 0.979 0.986 0.951 1.044 
1Special education weight of 2 only applies in the model with special education students (lower panel). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8. Estimated Expenditure Need with Pupil Weights Relative to Baseline, Using  
                 Subsidized Lunch Variable 
      
      
 
No Student 
Needs 
Adjustment 
Pupil 
Weights 
(Simple 
Avg.) 
Pupil Weights 
(Enrollment -
Weighted 
 Avg.) 
Poverty and 
LEP Weights 
=1 
Special 
 Education 
Weight =21 
Directly 
Estimated 
Pupil 
Weights 
 Without Special Education 
Ratio of Total Need With This 
  Adjustment to Total Need  
  with Full Cost Index 0.580 0.922 0.962 0.914 1.079 
        
Large Cities      
New York City 0.453 0.875 0.926 0.874 1.070 
Yonkers 0.509 0.914 0.962 0.942 1.100 
Upstate Big Three 0.437 0.862 0.913 0.835 0.058 
Small Cities      
Downstate 0.635 0.966 1.006 0.977 1.119 
Upstate 0.588 0.947 0.990 0.916 1.113 
Suburbs      
Downstate 0.813 0.986 1.007 0.992 1.066 
Upstate 0.804 1.004 1.028 0.981 1.096 
Rural      
Upstate 0.687 0.985 1.020 0.947 1.124 
 With Special Education 
Ratio of Total Need With This 
   Adjustment to Total Need      
   with Full Cost Index 0.470 0.852 0.899 0.802 1.075 
      
Large Cities      
New York City 0.353 0.790 0.845 0.734 1.044 
Yonkers 0.396 0.830 0.883 0.801 1.083 
Upstate Big Three 0.327 0.758 0.811 0.686 1.009 
Small Cities      
Downstate 0.525 0.911 0.957 0.877 1.136 
Upstate 0.476 0.882 0.931 0.810 1.118 
Suburbs      
Downstate 0.699 0.951 0.978 0.935 1.100 
Upstate 0.714 0.985 1.016 0.938 1.145 
Rural      
Upstate 0.595 0.952 0.996 0.877 1.162 
  1Special education weight of 2 only applies in the model with special education students (lower panel). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9.  State Aid Relative to Baseline for a Given State Aid Budget 
                                 Using Census Child Poverty Rate and LEP Rate 
       
 
No Student 
Needs 
Adjustment 
Pupil 
 Weights  
(Simple Avg.) 
Pupil Weights 
(Enrollment - 
Weighted Avg.) 
Poverty and LEP 
Weights =1 
Special 
Education 
Weight =21 
Directly 
Estimated 
Pupil 
Weights 
 
  
 Without Special Education 
 
Large Cities      
New York City 0.780 0.957 0.963 0.928 0.983 
Yonkers 0.800 0.965 0.969 0.952 0.994 
Upstate Big Three 0.788 0.959 0.965 0.917 0.979 
Small Cities      
Downstate 1.136 1.050 1.046 1.079 1.046 
Upstate 1.049 1.028 1.028 1.021 1.019 
Suburbs      
Downstate 1.579 1.096 1.079 1.190 1.035 
Upstate 1.459 1.084 1.071 1.146 1.026 
Rural      
Upstate 1.230 1.062 1.058 1.078 1.031 
      
      
 With Special Education 
      
Large Cities      
New York City 0.781 0.949 0.952 0.934 0.981 
Yonkers 0.767 0.944 0.946 0.937 0.981 
Upstate Big Three 0.761 0.937 0.940 0.916 0.966 
Small Cities      
Downstate 1.099 1.052 1.048 1.065 1.045 
Upstate 1.034 1.027 1.026 1.023 1.018 
Suburbs      
Downstate 1.527 1.121 1.108 1.165 1.045 
Upstate 1.490 1.120 1.109 1.151 1.037 
Rural      
Upstate 1.280 1.089 1.083 1.096 1.040 
Note: Performance standard is set at an index value of 160; required local tax rate is set at 1.5 percent. 
1Special education weight of 2 only applies in the model with special education students (lower panel). 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10.  State Aid Relative to Baseline for a Given State Aid Budget  
                 Using Share of Students Signed up for Subsidized Lunch 
       
 
No Student 
Needs 
Adjustment 
 
Pupil 
Weights  
(Simple 
Avg.) 
Pupil Weights 
(Enrollment - 
Weighted Avg.) 
Poverty and LEP 
Weights =1 
Special Education 
Weight =21 
Directly 
Estimated Pupil 
Weights 
 
  
 Without Special Education 
 
Large Cities      
New York City 0.740 0.937 0.950 0.942 0.980 
Yonkers 0.846 0.988 0.996 1.039 1.017 
Upstate Big Three 0.727 0.925 0.938 0.896 0.969 
Small Cities      
Downstate 1.186 1.078 1.072 1.109 1.058 
Upstate 0.039 1.038 1.036 0.999 1.032 
Suburbs      
Downstate 1.972 1.145 1.092 1.170 0.976 
Upstate 1.699 1.153 1.113 1.121 1.014 
Rural      
Upstate 1.312 1.106 1.090 1.050 1.052 
      
 With Special Education 
      
Large Cities      
New York City 0.707 0.918 0.935 0.905 0.965 
Yonkers 0.803 0.972 0.985 1.007 1.009 
Upstate Big Three 0.662 0.880 0.896 0.842 0.930 
Small Cities      
Downstate 1.195 1.112 1.111 1.150 1.097 
Upstate 1.032 1.053 1.056 1.022 1.053 
Suburbs      
Downstate 2.067 1.225 1.174 1.326 1.055 
Upstate 1.927 1.281 1.237 1.306 1.112 
Rural      
Upstate 1.430 1.190 1.178 1.155 1.124 
Note: Performance standard is set at an index value of 160; required local tax rate is set at 1.5 percent. 
1Special education weight of 2 only applies in the model with special education students (lower panel). 
 
 
 
Table A1.  Results of Education Cost Models1 
  
 With Census Poverty With Subsidized Lunch 
 
Variables Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Constant -2.6253 -2.53 -7.4910 -5.47 
     
Performance index 0.0073 2.87 0.0105 3.12 
     
Efficiency variables:2     
Full value 0.0000 9.31 0.0000 10.30 
Aid 0.8583 3.05 0.6872 2.39 
Income 0.0000 1.55 0.0000 -0.70 
     
Average teacher salary3 1.0006 8.06 1.4030 15.07 
     
Percent child poverty 
(2000)4 1.3071 4.06   
     
2-year avg. LEP4 0.9883 2.09   
     
K6 subsidized lunch rate4   0.9819 3.78 
     
Enrollment classes:5     
1,000-2,000 students -0.0823 -3.31 -0.0859 -3.28 
2,000-3,000 students -0.0896 -3.00 -0.0957 -3.15 
3,000-5,000 students -0.1067 -2.87 -0.1218 -3.35 
5,000-7,000 students -0.0915 -2.27 -0.1110 -2.73 
7,000-15,000 students -0.1019 -2.12 -0.1208 -2.53 
Over 15,000 students 0.0236 0.22 0.0308 0.27 
     
Adjusted R-square 0.485 0.457 
1Estimated with linear two-stage least squares regression, with student performance and teacher salaries 
treated as endogenous; operating spending per pupil is the dependent variable. 
2Calculated as the difference between district value and the average in peer group. 
3 For fulltime teachers with 1 to 5 years of experience.  Expressed as a natural logarithm. 
4All variables expressed as a percentage.  Coefficients are similar to elasticities. 
5The base enrollment is 0 to 1000 students.  The coefficients can be interpreted as the percent change in 
costs from being in this enrollment class compared to the base enrollment class. 
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